01 — Executive summaryGrowth bought at the price of the store
Green Tea Group reported revenue of RMB 2,675 million for the six months ended 30 June 2026, up 16.8%, and adjusted net profit of RMB 294 million, up 16.9%. Read against the store count it is a different story: the number of restaurants rose 46% over the same period, from 502 to 733, so the average store is doing about a sixth less business than a year ago.
This report applies a value-investing framework, not a growth narrative. The framework asks first whether a business has a durable advantage, and second whether the price compensates for the risk that it does not. Green Tea fails the first test more clearly than most companies we cover, and the market has noticed: the shares listed at HK$7.19 in May 2025, peaked at HK$9.81, and closed at HK$4.75 on 13 October 2026.
The bull case is not irrational. The new small-store format earns 48.4% more dine-in revenue per square metre than the legacy estate, with a stated payback of 12.6 months against 19.3. Delivery grew 24.1% and is capped below 30% of the mix by choice. There is no material bank debt, and profit converts to cash at more than twice over.
The bear case is arithmetic. Same-store sales fell 9.7% in the half; the average ticket has fallen every year since 2023, from RMB 61.8 to 54.4; table turnover fell to 2.9 times a day. Partners Group, which held the stock for nine years, sold its entire remaining stake in September 2026 at around HK$4.92. Our base case values the shares at HK$5.60 — a 17.9% gain that does not clear the 20–50% margin of safety the framework requires. We rate the shares Neutral with a HK$5.60 target.
02 — The macro backdropA category growing slower than the estate
Green Tea operates in the most crowded part of Chinese consumer spending. A top-down read starts with how fast the category is growing.
Chinese restaurant revenue was RMB 7.9 trillion in 2024 and is projected to reach RMB 11.0 trillion by 2029, a compound growth rate of 7.1% — and that projection is the company's own. Chain penetration is rising, which favours organised operators over independents.
The problem is the ratio. A category compounding at 7% cannot absorb an operator compounding its estate at 30% to 60% without each store doing less. Consumer spending has been subdued — nominal retail sales have settled near 4% — and a value proposition already priced at RMB 54 per head has little room to fall further.
03 — Industry structureThe most competitive corner of Chinese consumption
The framework's industry test asks three things: is the industry growing, are entry barriers high, and is competition rational. Casual Chinese dining answers the first favourably and the other two badly.
A restaurant is cheap to open and easy to copy. There is no licence that protects a menu, no network effect that locks in a diner, no switching cost that keeps a family returning once the food stops being interesting. What protects a chain is brand and scale — the ability to buy ingredients cheaper than the restaurant next door and to be chosen first in a shopping mall. Green Tea has both. Those advantages are also the weakest kind of moat the framework recognises: they defend against an independent across the street and do nothing against a rival chain with its own brand and scale.
And when an operator grows at six times the rate of the category, the marginal store competes with the company's own stores two floors up in the same mall.
04 — The business modelA restaurant that sells ingredients through a small box
Green Tea describes itself as a casual Chinese restaurant operator with a “new-Chinese-style” brand identity. Beneath the marketing, the model is a vertically integrated supply chain selling a standardised menu through small urban boxes.
The company runs eight regional central warehouses, buys direct from source, and rotates a menu hard — more than 500 new dishes a year, differentiated by region. Converting agricultural inputs into a plate of food at a 68.3% gross margin is the core of the business.
Dine-in is 75.3% of revenue and grew 14.6%. Delivery is 24.3% and grew 24.1%, and management caps it below 30% on purpose: a delivery order carries a platform commission and forgoes the beverage and dessert attachment that turns a dine-in visit into a profitable one.
05 — Revenue qualityWhere the growth actually comes from
The composition of growth matters more than its level. Green Tea's revenue rises and falls with the store count, not with the performance of the stores themselves.
In FY2025 revenue grew 24.1% on an estate 31% larger — close enough that the growth looked organic. In the first half of 2026 revenue grew 16.8% on an estate 46% larger. The gap between those two numbers is the investment case: it is the difference between a company that is expanding and one that is adding capacity faster than it is selling.
Management's rebuttal is that the new stores are smaller by design — 183 of roughly 200 planned 2026 openings are under 450 square metres — so a lower revenue per store is the intended outcome of a higher return on capital. That argument has force, and the next sections test it.
06 — The moatA brand, a supply chain, and not much else
The framework's first question is what stops a competitor from taking the business. For Green Tea the honest answer is a brand that carries recognition and a supply chain that carries a cost advantage — both real, neither durable in the way a network is.
Green Tea is, by its own marketing, a “first-generation internet-famous” restaurant — it built a following in the 2010s on queues and social-media tourism. Brand recognition in China's mall restaurant category is worth something: it gets a mall to sign a lease and a diner to choose one restaurant over another when prices are similar. It does not survive a rival opening a cheaper concept next door.
The supply chain is the stronger asset. Eight central warehouses, direct sourcing and centralised production give Green Tea a procurement cost an independent cannot match, and that cost advantage is what makes a 68% gross margin possible on a RMB 54 average ticket. But scale in food procurement is exactly the advantage a larger rival can acquire, which is why the framework treats it as a moat of the second rank.
This matters for the valuation. A business with a network moat can be bought at a modest discount and still be a bargain, because the moat keeps returns high. A business whose moat is brand and scale, in a category with low entry barriers and price wars, must be bought at a large discount — because the return it earns today may be competed away tomorrow. Green Tea is the second kind of business.
07 — Unit economicsThe number the store count hides
A roll-up can grow revenue for years while the underlying unit deteriorates. The way to tell the difference is to look at what a single store earns, not at what the group earns.
The average ticket has fallen every year since 2023 — from RMB 61.8 to 56.2 to 54.6 to 54.4 in the first half of 2026. Table turnover fell from 3.1 to 2.9 times a day. Multiply the two and you get average daily revenue per store, which the company reports going from roughly RMB 20,000 to 16,800.
The company's own same-store cohort tells the same story. Across a 371-store sample, same-store sales fell 9.7% in the first half of 2026 — a sharp reversal of the roughly flat outcome in FY2025 that management had highlighted as evidence of resilience. The explanation offered is that large legacy stores over 500 square metres and more than eight years old are losing traffic.
A fully depreciated store losing sales is still a store losing sales: the cash rent still has to be paid. And the most likely mechanism is cannibalisation — a new small store opened where Green Tea already trades pulls revenue from the old store while adding a second lease and a second fit-out. At the level of the district the return is far below the store-level return the company advertises, and the framework pays for the district.
08 — Management & allocationBuying back stock at HK$9.42
Capital allocation is the clearest window into management quality, and Green Tea's record over the last eighteen months repays close reading.
Between January and May 2026 the company repurchased 13.4 million shares for RMB 106 million, at average prices rising from HK$7.25 in January to HK$9.42 in May. It then stopped. The stock closed at HK$4.75 in October 2026 — roughly half what the company itself paid four months earlier. One can read this generously, as confidence in the business, or sceptically, as buying stock at a premium to where the market now values it. Either way it is a capital-allocation choice worth watching.
On governance the picture is also mixed. The company is controlled by its founders, Wang Qinsong and Lu Changmei, through Time Sonic Investments, which holds 56.51% of the shares. The free float is about 24%, the shares are not in Stock Connect, and liquidity is thin. In September 2026 Partners Group — a nine-year holder — sold its entire remaining stake in an off-market block, and the non-executive director it had nominated resigned the same day. There is no history of restatement or sanction. But a concentrated register and thin liquidity are reasons to demand a wider discount.
09 — ProfitabilityA high return on equity, and two reasons to distrust it
The framework's core profitability test is a sustained, high return on equity, decomposed so that the source is visible. Green Tea passes the headline test — the decomposition is where the caveats live.
Return on equity was 40.3% in FY2025 on the Haitong International model (38.9% on the company's own average-equity basis), roughly four times any reasonable cost of equity. That is the strongest single fact in the company's favour. Two qualifications are essential, however.
First, the May 2025 IPO roughly doubled the equity base but only part-way through the year, so the FY2025 denominator is smaller than it will be going forward — the model expects the ratio to fall to 34.1% in 2026 even as profit grows. Second, IFRS 16 moves rent out of operating expense and into depreciation of right-of-use assets. Green Tea's right-of-use assets were RMB 1,215 million at 30 June 2026 and its lease liabilities the same: the estate is, in substance, rented. That treatment flatters the reported operating margin and, on a lease-adjusted basis, the return.
10 — Margin structureA 68% gross margin with one place to hide a discount
The gross margin is the number to watch in a value-positioned restaurant, because in a category that competes on price it is the only figure that can absorb a discount.
Green Tea's gross margin is 68.3% and has been within a point of that level for three years — high for a restaurant and stable. That stability is a genuine strength: the company has not had to discount its food to keep traffic.
It is also a risk waiting its turn. The industry is characterised by price wars, and a 68% gross margin is an invitation. If competition intensifies, the discount comes out of that margin: every point given away at RMB 2,675 million of half-year revenue is about RMB 27 million of profit — a seventh of the adjusted net profit the company just reported. The margin is the buffer, and the buffer is finite.
11 — Cash conversionProfit that arrives at the till
Reported profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. The framework's second quantitative test is whether operating cash flow corroborates the income statement. For a restaurant this is the least contentious test in the framework.
FY2025 operating cash flow was RMB 1,050 million against net profit of RMB 486 million, a conversion ratio above two times. That is not an anomaly: a restaurant collects at the till, holds no meaningfully aged receivables, and turns its inventory in fifteen days. The first half of 2026 shows the reverse — operating cash flow of RMB 147 million against profit of RMB 291 million — but that is a timing effect, as new stores consume working capital at the front end. On a full-year view the conversion is strong.
12 — Capital intensityOperations fund the growth, the dividend and the buyback
The framework prefers capital-light businesses because they convert profit into distributable cash with high certainty. A restaurant chain is the opposite of capital-light at the store level.
FY2025 operating cash flow of RMB 1,050 million less RMB 323 million of property and equipment purchases left roughly RMB 727 million of free cash flow before lease principal. From that the company declared a RMB 0.52 final dividend and a HKD 0.30 interim dividend, and bought back RMB 106 million of stock. Cash fell only modestly, from RMB 1,199 million to RMB 1,183 million.
So the business does generate cash and does return some of it. But the arithmetic that matters is the one the framework keeps returning to: is the reinvestment earning more than the capital returned? If the new stores pay back in 12.6 months as management states, the reinvestment beats the buyback at HK$9.42 outright. If they do not, the company is spending cash on growth that does not earn while buying back stock at prices the market has since halved. The free cash flow is real; the return on it is unproven.
13 — The balance sheetNo bank debt, but the leases scale with the estate
The framework screens for leverage first, on the view that a value investor's first job is to survive. Green Tea's balance sheet is not a source of danger, but the direction of travel reversed in 2026.
Cash and equivalents were RMB 1,183 million at 30 June 2026, and the company carries no material bank borrowings. The asset-liability ratio fell from 68.7% at the end of 2024 to 53.8% at the end of 2025 as the IPO proceeds paid down pre-listing liabilities, then rose back to 60.8% by 30 June 2026 as right-of-use assets, lease liabilities and payables grew with the estate. Inventory turns in fifteen days, and receivables in two.
The distinction that matters is between debt and leases. Almost all of the liabilities are obligations to landlords and suppliers, not to banks — RMB 1,215 million of lease liabilities against a RMB 1,183 million cash balance. That is conservative for a chain growing at this pace, and it means a bad year is survivable. But the leases scale with the store count, and adding fixed obligations against falling revenue per unit only shows up as a problem after several such years.
14 — The overseas optionFourteen stores out of 733
Management has framed overseas expansion as a second growth engine. The unit data support the enthusiasm; the scale does not — yet.
Green Tea ended 2025 with 14 overseas restaurants: nine in Hong Kong, three in Malaysia, and one each in Singapore and Thailand. They generated more than RMB 140 million of revenue, roughly fifteen times the prior year, at a revenue per store two to four times the domestic average. Management targets more than 30 stores overseas in 2026.
The honest read is that this is an option, not a business. Fourteen stores out of 733 is under 2% of the estate, and a brand built on “new-Chinese-style” identity has yet to prove it travels beyond markets with a dense Chinese diaspora. In a report whose central case is that the domestic unit economics are deteriorating, overseas is upside we do not pay for.
15 — Intrinsic valueA discounted cash flow that brackets the price
The framework's preferred method is a discounted cash flow on sustainable free cash flow, because it forces every assumption into the open. Here the range is unusually wide for a reason that is itself the finding.
The starting figure is normalised owner earnings of RMB 500 million — deliberately below the FY2025 operating cash flow less capex of RMB 727 million, to allow for the falling revenue per store. We grow that at 12% for five years and 3% thereafter. Across a cost of capital of 9–11% and terminal growth of 2–3%, the operating business plus net cash is worth HK$5.20 to HK$6.90 a share.
Every cell clears the HK$4.75 price, which looks encouraging until you see how much of the value comes from the growth assumption. The difference between growing owner earnings at 12% and at 4% is most of the range, and the growth assumption is precisely what the falling same-store series puts in doubt. A DCF that clears the price only because of a growth rate the company has not demonstrated is a bet on the assumption.
16 — Relative valuationThe cheapest restaurant stock in the peer set
The framework also asks how the shares are priced against the company's own history and against comparable businesses. On both, Green Tea is cheap — and the question is why.
Green Tea trades at roughly 4.7 times trailing earnings. The restaurant peer set — Yum China, Haidilao, Super Hi International, Jiumaojiu, Xiaocaiyuan, DPC Dash — trades between 9 and 29 times. Green Tea is at roughly a quarter of the average. The Haitong model had it at 7.2 times FY2026 earnings when the stock was HK$7.79; at HK$4.75 it is nearer 4.4 times.
Against its own short history the shares are at the bottom of the range: 34% below the HK$7.19 offer price and 52% below the HK$9.81 high. The company listed only in May 2025, so there is no meaningful multi-year band to compare against.
The discount is not a growth discount; the estate grew 46%. It is not a balance-sheet discount; the company carries no bank debt. It is a discount for the quality of the growth, the governance and the unit economics. The framework's instruction is not to assume the discount closes but to size the position for the risk that it does not. The market may simply be reading the same-store series correctly.
17 — Margin of safetyAn 18% gain is not a margin of safety
The framework buys only where the price sits 20–50% below calculated intrinsic value. For Green Tea the most defensible method is a sum-of-the-parts: an operating business plus the cash on the balance sheet.
At HK$4.75 the market capitalisation is HK$3.20 billion. Our base case applies 6 times estimated FY2026 earnings of roughly RMB 640 million to the operating business, giving HK$3.94 a share, and adds net cash of HK$1.66 — a total of HK$5.60, a 17.9% gain.
The framework requires a 20–50% margin of safety. An 18% gain does not meet it. To reach a 20% margin of safety the shares would have to fall to HK$4.67 on our base case, and to reach the middle of the band they would have to be near HK$3.90. The point is not that HK$4.75 is expensive; it is that the price already reflects a fair amount of the recovery.
18 — ScenariosWhat the price already assumes
We run three cases, each built from two explicit inputs: the multiple applied to forward earnings, and whether same-store sales stabilise.
| Scenario | Earnings multiple | Same-store | Value per share | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 4.0x | Decline continues | HK$3.10 | 25% |
| Base | 6.0x | Stabilises near zero | HK$5.60 | 50% |
| Bull | 9.0x | Small-store model delivers | HK$8.10 | 25% |
Multiple applied to estimated FY2026 earnings of roughly RMB 640 million; net cash of HK$1.66 per share added in every case. Probability-weighted value HK$5.45 against a HK$4.75 price. Farstar estimates.
The distribution is the finding. Our bear case, HK$3.10, is 35% below the price and assumes the decline continues and the market applies a 4 times multiple — at which a shrinking restaurant chain is not obviously mispriced. Our bull case, HK$8.10, requires both that the small-store model proves out and that the market re-rates to 9 times. The probability-weighted value of HK$5.45 is a 15% gain — and that is the crux. The asymmetry is not generous enough to compensate for the quality of the business.
19 — The bull caseIn one page
The new store model is genuinely better. Fresh openings earn 48.4% more dine-in revenue per square metre than legacy stores, with a stated payback of 12.6 months against 19.3. If that holds as the estate matures, the average store gets more productive, not less.
The growth is self-funded. No bank debt, RMB 1,183 million of cash, free cash flow of RMB 727 million in FY2025, and cash conversion above two times. The company pays a dividend and buys back stock out of operating cash flow, not borrowing.
Two optionality engines are attached. Delivery grew 24.1% and is capped by choice; overseas revenue per store is two to four times the domestic average. Neither is priced in at a 4.7 times trailing multiple.
The discount is extreme. At under five times earnings with a 68% gross margin and a 40% return on equity, the shares are priced as though the company is in terminal decline. A re-rating to 9 times, still below the peer average, gives HK$8.10.
20 — The bear caseIn one page
The unit economics are diluting, not compounding. Store count grew 46% while revenue grew 16.8%; same-store sales fell 9.7%; table turnover fell to 2.9; revenue per store fell from RMB 20,000 to 16,800; the average ticket has fallen four years running. Every measure of store productivity is moving the wrong way at once.
The growth is cannibalisation. New small stores opened in the same trade areas as legacy stores transfer revenue from an old store to a new one while adding a second lease and a second fit-out. The district-level return is far below the store-level return management advertises, and the framework pays for the district.
The most informed outside holder left. Partners Group, a nine-year holder, sold its entire remaining stake in September 2026 at around HK$4.92 — half the 2025 high — and its board nominee resigned the same day.
Food safety scales with the store count. In August 2026 a contractor was reported to have used a banned pesticide near tableware and food at the company's restaurants; months later no formal investigation had been published. In a business whose brand is the product, an unresolved quality failure at a doubled estate is the most dangerous risk on the list.
21 — Risk screeningWhat could break the thesis
The framework screens fundamental, financial, external and governance risks before a position is built; the table states each and how it would show up.
| Risk | Type | Probability | Impact | How it would show up |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Same-store sales keep falling into 2027 | Fundamental | High | High | Revenue per store declines a third year; the 12.6-month payback never materialises |
| New stores cannibalise legacy stores | Fundamental | High | High | Group revenue grows slower than the store count; district-level returns compress |
| Price war compresses the 68% gross margin | External | Medium | High | Gross margin falls two points; roughly a quarter of adjusted profit disappears |
| Another food-safety incident | Fundamental | Medium | High | Traffic drops at affected stores; brand damage outlasts the event |
| Store openings miss the 200 target | Fundamental | Medium | Medium | Revenue growth undershoots guidance; the FY2026 estimate is cut |
| Fixed costs grow faster than revenue | Financial | Medium | Medium | Employee and lease costs rise faster than sales; asset-liability ratio rises further |
| Overseas expansion stalls | External | Medium | Low | Fewer than 30 overseas stores in 2026; the second engine does not arrive |
| Further strategic-holder selling | Governance | Medium | Medium | More of the register clears; the free float and liquidity stay thin |
| Founder-controlled register constrains reform | Governance | High | Low | 56.51% concentration; minority holders cannot force a change of strategy |
| Thin liquidity and no Stock Connect | External | High | Low | The multiple stays depressed regardless of earnings; exit is slow |
| Consumer spending weakens further | External | Medium | Medium | Dine-in traffic falls at all stores; the value proposition is already priced low |
| Rent renegotiation risk on the estate | Financial | Low | Medium | Lease liabilities rise on renewal; payback periods extend |
22 — The holding decisionWhat we would need to see before owning it
The framework is explicit: buy in batches at low valuations, hold while the fundamentals hold, and sell when the price exceeds intrinsic value or the logic deteriorates. On this business the framework's answer is to wait, and the wait has a specific trigger.
Buying criteria — not met
The framework requires a 20–50% margin of safety, a durable moat, and evidence that the reinvestment earns more than the capital returned. Green Tea meets the third condition weakly — free cash flow is real but the return on the new stores is unproven — and fails the first two. Its base case is an 18% gain, short of the required discount. We would not initiate a position at HK$4.75.
What would change our mind
Two consecutive quarters of same-store sales at or above zero, with revenue per store stabilised; or a fall in the share price toward the middle of the framework's band, near HK$3.90; or formal disclosure of the food-safety remediation. Any one of those would move the base case meaningfully.
If already held — hold, with a limit
An investor who owns the shares at HK$4.75 is not being asked to sell at a loss that already reflects the deterioration. The dividend is real, the balance sheet is clean, and the price already discounts a lot. We would hold, size the position modestly, and treat any failure of same-store sales to stabilise by the FY2026 results as the trigger to reduce.
The two events that matter
The FY2026 annual results in March 2027 will show whether the store count reached roughly 800 and, more importantly, whether same-store sales stabilised in the second half. Any interim trading update showing continued decline would be the earliest confirmation that the bull case has not arrived. Watch the average ticket and the table turnover as much as the revenue line.
23 — ConclusionA cheap stock, for the right reasons
Green Tea is a twenty-year-old restaurant brand that listed in May 2025 into a growth narrative and has spent every quarter since watching that narrative get harder to sustain. The store count roughly doubled in eighteen months; same-store sales fell 9.7%; the average ticket has declined for four straight years; and the most informed outside holder sold its entire stake at half the 2025 high.
What the framework adds is discipline. It does not ask whether Chinese dining is a big market, or whether the brand is famous, or whether delivery is growing. It asks whether the business has an advantage a competitor cannot buy, whether the accounts corroborate the story, and whether the price compensates for the risk. Green Tea's accounts are clean and its margins are high, but its advantage is the second-rank kind, its reinvestment return is unproven, and its price — under five times earnings — is the correct price of a roll-up whose unit economics are falling, not a bargain the market has overlooked. Our base case is HK$5.60; the bear case, HK$3.10, assumes the decline continues. That the bear case sits close to the price is the argument for patience.
Neutral · HK$5.60 target
A cheap stock with a cheap reason: the estate is growing six times faster than the category while the average store does less business. We would become constructive on two consecutive quarters of flat-or-better same-store sales, or on a price near HK$3.90 that restores the framework's margin of safety. We would turn negative if the store count keeps rising while same-store sales keep falling.
24 — AppendixFinancial summary
| RMB millions unless stated | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | H1 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 3,949 | 3,838 | 4,763 | 2,290 | 2,675 |
| Revenue growth, % | +46.9 | +3.4 | +24.1 | — | +16.8 |
| Dine-in revenue | — | — | 3,541 | 1,758 | 2,014 |
| Delivery revenue | — | — | 1,204 | 524 | 651 |
| Gross margin, % | 67.1 | 68.0 | 68.3 | — | 68.8 |
| Employee cost, % of revenue | — | — | 26.1 | 25.8 | 26.1 |
| Net profit (IFRS) | — | 350 | 486 | 234 | 291 |
| Net profit growth, % | — | — | +38.9 | — | +24.4 |
| Adjusted net profit | — | 361 | 509 | 251 | 294 |
| Adjusted net margin, % | — | 9.4 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 11.0 |
| Basic EPS, RMB | — | — | 0.80 | — | 0.46 |
| Return on equity, % | — | — | 40.3 | — | — |
| Operating cash flow | — | — | 1,050 | 121 | 147 |
| Capital expenditure | — | — | 323 | — | — |
| Free cash flow | — | — | 727 | — | — |
| Cash and equivalents | — | 247 | 1,199 | 1,130 | 1,183 |
| Lease liabilities | — | — | 957 | — | 1,215 |
| Asset-liability ratio, % | — | 68.7 | 53.8 | — | 60.8 |
| Restaurants, period end | ~360 | 452 | 609 | 502 | 733 |
| Same-store sales, % | — | −10.3 | −0.8 | — | −9.7 |
| Table turnover, times per day | 3.30 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.10 | 2.90 |
| Average ticket, RMB | 61.8 | 56.2 | 54.6 | 55.5 | 54.4 |
FY2023 dine-in and delivery splits and the FY2023 equity base are not restated, so no FY2023 return on equity or segment split is presented. Free cash flow is defined as operating cash flow less purchases of property, plant and equipment, before lease principal. Restaurants at end-2023 are approximate. Market data as of 13 October 2026.
25 — SourcesPrimary and secondary references
| Reference | Date | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| Green Tea Group, interim results announcement for the six months ended 30 June 2026 (HKEXnews) | 24 Aug 2026 | H1 2026 revenue, segment split, profit, adjusted profit, margins, store count, same-store sample, tax, balance sheet |
| Green Tea Group, 2026 interim report (HKEXnews) | 24 Sep 2026 | Balance sheet detail, cash flow statement, lease liabilities, share buybacks and prices paid, shareholding structure |
| Green Tea Group, annual results announcement for FY2025 (HKEXnews) | 23 Mar 2026 | FY2025 revenue and profit, adjusted net margin, store count and openings, same-store, new-store economics, overseas stores, dividend |
| Green Tea Group, announcement of Partners Gourmet share-sale arrangements | 21 Apr 2026 | The 15.96% strategic-holder disposal programme |
| Green Tea Group, announcement of the disposal of the remaining Partners Group stake and the non-executive director's resignation | 21 Sep 2026 | The strategic-investor exit and the change of the board |
| Green Tea Group, monthly return of equity issuers | 6 Oct 2026 | Shares in issue, buyback and cancellation activity |
| Haitong International, Green Tea Group (6831 HK) company note and model | 25 Mar 2026 | 2026–2028 estimates, peer valuation set, ROE and margin decomposition, unit-economics data points |
| 海报新闻 / 半岛网 on the strategic-holder exit and the food-safety episode | 8 Oct 2026 | Partners Group exit detail; the August 2026 pesticide-disinfection report; the contractor penalty |
| 智通财经, H1 2026 interim results coverage | 24 Aug 2026 | Revenue and profit confirmation; delivery mix |
| 知乎, “绿茶集团发布上市首年成绩单” | 25 Mar 2026 | FY2025 same-store growth by city tier; per-store sales detail |
| 同花顺 F10 (HK6831), basic data and institutional ratings | Oct 2026 | Shares outstanding, market capitalisation, P/E, P/B, ROE, debt ratio, broker target prices |
| CNR / 中国经济网, IPO coverage | 16 May 2025 | Offer price HK$7.19, shares issued, first-day performance, market capitalisation at listing |
| National statistics bureaux; IMF World Economic Outlook | Jul 2026 | China macro and consumer-spending backdrop |
26 — DisclosureConflicts, positions and method
Positions and compensation. Farstar Capital holds no position in Green Tea Group Limited (6831.HK) or in any company named in this report, and receives no compensation from Green Tea or from any party with an interest in the securities discussed. Coverage is selected by us. This report was not previewed by the company.
Every figure traces to a filing, an earnings release, a company announcement, a broker model or a market data provider, each identified above; derived numbers are stated as such. The FY2026 estimates, the peer and historical multiples and the discounted cash flow are ours and are labelled indicative where they are not reported figures. Neutral means we expect a total return in line with the market over twelve months, with the target set at our base case. Green Tea does not disclose revenue per store, so our analysis of cannibalisation is inferred from the same-store and per-store series the company does publish — a limitation reflected in the width of our scenario range.
Not investment advice. This report is published for informational purposes only and is not an offer, a solicitation, or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Figures are believed accurate as of the publication date but are not warranted, and past performance does not indicate future results.