Perrigo Company plc

01 — Executive summaryThe write-off machine and the cash machine are the same company

In the six months to June 2026, Perrigo Company plc erased $331.8 million of goodwill. In the six months before that, it erased $1,325.3 million. The two charges together are $1,657.1 million — four-fifths of the company's entire market capitalisation, which stood at $2.09 billion on 9 October 2026. In the same eighteen months the chief executive who designed the turnaround was asked to resign, Dermacosmetics was sold, two more businesses were put under strategic review, and the dividend was left untouched at $1.16 a share.

That is an unusual set of events for one company, and it produces an unusual share price. Perrigo trades at 7.0 times the midpoint of its own guided 2026 adjusted earnings — roughly a third of what Church & Dwight, Kenvue and Haleon trade at — while yielding 7.70%. The stock has also risen 63% from its 52-week low of $9.23, and the sell side, five analysts deep, is a Buy with a $16.50 target.

Our conclusion is that the market is not mispricing Perrigo; it is mislabelling it. Perrigo is not a dividend stock that happens to be cheap. It is a deleveraging vehicle wearing a dividend costume, and the 7.7% yield is not income — it is the price the market charges for the probability that the payout gets reset. Read the capital-allocation line rather than the income statement and the picture resolves: every dollar of the roughly $600 million of divestiture proceeds generated since 2024 has gone to debt, and none to shareholders — at four turns of leverage there is no other choice.

We rate the shares Neutral with a 12-month target of $14.00, a 7% discount to the 9 October close. That is below the street, and it is below the price. It is also not a bearish call in the ordinary sense: we would be buyers in the low teens and sellers above $18. What it is, is a refusal to pay today for a second half that Perrigo has promised rather than delivered.

02 — Company & business modelA contract manufacturer that owns the store's own brand

Perrigo is a Dublin-domiciled, New York-listed consumer self-care company with about 8,100 employees. It makes the over-the-counter medicines that sit on the pharmacy shelf with the retailer's name on them — cough and cold remedies, allergy tablets, painkillers, antacids, digestive remedies, nicotine replacement, infant formula, blister plasters and, unusually, a growing portfolio of its own brands.

The business was reorganised on 1 January 2026, replacing the old geographic split with three operating segments: Self Care (the legacy upper-respiratory, digestive, pain and healthy-lifestyle categories, including the store-brand contract book), Specialty Care (Women's Health and Skin Health — home to Opill, ellaOne and Compeed), and Infant Formula, which stands alone, itself a statement of intent given the strategic review. A fourth line, "All Other", carries Oral Care.

The economics of the store-brand model are the thing to understand. Perrigo does not own the consumer relationship; the retailer does. That is why adjusted gross margin is 35.6% rather than the 55–60% a branded consumer-health company earns, and why the company spends comparatively little on advertising outside Specialty Care. What it gets in return is volume, shelf space and a structural tailwind: retailers have a permanent incentive to expand private label, because the margin is better for them and the price is better for a value-seeking shopper. It is a good business to be the biggest in, and a difficult one to raise prices in.

03 — The transitionThe CEO left in June, and the plan he wrote is still running

On 8 June 2026 Perrigo announced that Patrick Lockwood-Taylor had resigned as president and chief executive and as a board member, effective immediately. The board's determination, in its own words, was that "certain personal conduct by Mr. Lockwood-Taylor was not consistent with the Company's Code of Conduct and core values" — conduct that, the release adds, "did not involve the Company's business, strategy, operations, financial reporting, or results of operations."

Albert A. Manzone, a director since 2022 and most recently deputy chief executive of Monte-Carlo Société des Bains de Mer — a luxury hospitality group — took over as interim president and chief executive. The board, chaired by Orlando D. Ashford, said it had begun a comprehensive search for a permanent successor. As of mid-October 2026, none has been named.

It is tempting to treat a for-cause departure as a footnote when the company insists it does not touch the business. That is the wrong read, for a reason unrelated to the conduct itself. The Three-S plan — Perrigo's entire turnaround framework — is a credibility asset. It asks investors to believe that a cost programme will deliver, that service levels will hold, that a second half will be stronger, and that two strategic reviews will produce value — a story resting on management execution. When the executive who authored the story leaves mid-year, and the board replaces him with a director whose last operating role was in luxury hospitality, the story loses its narrator at precisely the moment it needs one.

The counter-argument is that the plan has been institutionalised: guidance was reaffirmed on the same day as the announcement, and the operating metrics kept improving through the second quarter under the interim chief. Both readings are defensible. What is not is assuming the question away. Succession is the largest unmodelled variable in the equity.

04 — The Three-S planEverything is improving except the revenue line

Perrigo describes its turnaround as the Three-S plan: Stabilize, delivering consistent execution; Streamline, simplifying the business; and Strengthen, leveraging the platform to drive growth. On the operational metrics the company chooses to publish, the plan is working.

United States service levels have risen 1,600 basis points since 2023, to 91%, and international service levels are up 1,000 basis points, to 95%. Divestitures since 2024 have generated roughly $600 million of upfront proceeds, all applied to debt reduction. The Operational Enhancement Program is targeted to deliver $80–100 million of savings by 2027, with about 80% of that landing in 2026. The innovation pipeline is described as three times its 2024 value. In the second quarter Perrigo gained 50 basis points of United States volume share, 50 basis points of value share across its key European brands, and share in seven of its eight United States categories.

This is not a criticism of the plan; it is a description of its scope. A cost-and-portfolio programme can make a shrinking business more valuable. It cannot make it grow.

05 — The second quarterThree point two percent down, and a gain that flattered the print

Perrigo reported second-quarter net sales of $1,022.8 million, down 3.2% year over year. On the company's Core basis — which excludes Infant Formula and the announced divestitures — sales were $907 million, down 3.1%, and Core organic sales fell 3.5%. Adjusted gross margin compressed 250 basis points to 35.6% on an All In basis. Adjusted operating margin slipped 60 basis points to 12.2%, and adjusted diluted earnings per share fell 12.3%, to $0.50.

The reported figure went the other way. GAAP diluted earnings per share was $0.63, against essentially zero a year earlier, because the sale of the Dermacosmetics business closed inside the quarter and generated a gain large enough to move net interest and other income by $124.1 million. For one quarter, Perrigo's GAAP earnings were manufactured by selling a business rather than by running one. That is a legitimate transaction — the proceeds went straight to debt — but it is worth being precise about what the headline number represents.

Cash flow from operations was $83 million, against $40 million of dividends and $14 million of capital expenditure; cash stood at $400 million and total debt at $3.3 billion. The company reaffirmed its full-year outlook for the third consecutive reporting date.

06 — The second halfTwo-thirds of the year's earnings are promised after June

The arithmetic that matters most: Perrigo earned $0.93 of All In adjusted earnings per share in the first half — $0.43 in the first quarter, $0.50 in the second. Reaffirmed guidance for the full year is $2.00 to $2.30, which implies a second half of approximately $1.10 to $1.40 — a range the company discloses on slide 22 of its second-quarter presentation.

To hit even the low end of the full-year range the second half has to deliver about 1.3 times the first half; to hit the high end, 1.5 times. Management's explanation is specific and, on its face, reasonable: the under-absorption that dragged on the first half moderates, category comparisons get easier, interest expense falls, and the cost-savings programme lands. Roughly $0.44 of the guided $0.60 under-absorption impact was taken in the first half, so the drag genuinely does fade.

The problem is not that the bridge is wrong. It is that the bridge has been the story for three reporting periods running while the revenue line that is supposed to carry it has not yet turned. Category consumption did improve through the second quarter — United States over-the-counter market value growth moved from −3.1% to −0.4% — which is the most encouraging data point in the release. But a company that needs a hockey-stick second half has no margin for a soft cough-and-cold season.

07 — Organic growthThe business Perrigo wants valued is shrinking fastest

Growth decomposes into four pieces: price, volume, mix and currency. Perrigo's second quarter had a little of the last and none of the first three. Pricing declined 0.7%, volume and mix fell 2.4%, and currency translation added roughly a point. That is why the reported decline of 3.2% looks gentler than the organic decline of 1.3% — and why the Core organic decline of 3.5% is the number that actually describes the go-forward business.

The company's decision to report on both an "All In" and a "Core" basis is unusual and worth dwelling on. Core strips out Infant Formula, which is under strategic review, and the announced divestitures. It is, in other words, the business Perrigo is asking to be valued on. In the first quarter that business shrank 11.0% organically; in the second, 3.5%. The trend is improving, the level is still negative, and it is worse than the All In number in both periods — because the segment Perrigo is trying to sell is the one that is growing.

08 — The segmentsOne high-margin engine, one cash cow, one problem

On the new reporting basis, the second quarter breaks into four very different businesses. Self Care, the store-brand and legacy OTC book, produced $577 million of sales, down 3.7%, and $79 million of operating income — a 13.7% margin that fell 16.2% year over year. Specialty Care, the branded Women's Health and Skin Health business, produced $227 million of sales, down 2.8%, and $48 million of operating income, a 21.1% margin that nevertheless fell 27.9%. Infant Formula produced $101 million of sales, up 23.1%, and swung from a $12 million operating loss to a $4 million operating profit. "All Other", which carries Oral Care, produced $119 million, down 16.9%.

Two observations follow. First, Specialty Care is the only part of Perrigo with genuine brand economics — a 21% operating margin is roughly double the group — and the only part where the company is investing in demand generation rather than cost reduction. Its operating income fell nearly 28% precisely because that investment went up, largely behind Opill. Growth here is being purchased, and it will take several quarters to learn whether the price was fair.

Second, the portfolio has an awkward shape. The highest-margin business is the smallest. The largest is the lowest-margin one and is shrinking. The fastest-growing is the one management is trying to exit. That is not a problem a cost programme can solve; only capital allocation can.

09 — Infant FormulaThe first strategic review, and the reason for the write-down

Perrigo announced a strategic review of its Infant Formula business in November 2025. The segment was the principal reason for the $1,325.3 million goodwill impairment booked at the end of that year: the company cited lower expected cash flows "principally related to infant formula market dynamics" alongside a sustained decline in its share price.

The second quarter flattered it. Sales rose 23.1% on the timing of contract shipments and increased store-brand formula sales, and the segment swung to a small operating profit. Management was careful to attribute the growth to shipment timing rather than consumption, and that is the honest framing: this is a business whose quarterly revenue is decided by contract calendars and whose margin depends on factory utilisation. Selling it would remove roughly $400 million of annualised revenue and a volatile, capital-intensive, low-return operation. Whether a buyer pays a sensible price is the open question.

10 — Specialty CareOpill is the only brand story Perrigo owns

Opill, the first over-the-counter daily oral contraceptive approved in the United States, is the most interesting asset in the company. It sits in a category — Women's Health — where Perrigo grew volume 9.8% and gained 50 basis points of share in the second quarter, alongside ellaOne in emergency contraception and Compeed in blister care. These are brands with pricing power, sold through the same retail relationships that carry the store-brand book.

The strategic logic is straightforward: Specialty Care is where Perrigo keeps the margin that the store-brand business gives away. The financial logic is less so. The segment lost more than a quarter of its operating income in the quarter, because supporting Opill's awareness requires advertising that a contract manufacturer does not normally pay for. That is the right trade if the brand compounds. The prescription-to-over-the-counter switch pipeline is the structural tailwind — each switch creates a category only a handful of manufacturers can supply on day one — and it is the part of the business least exposed to the tariff and category issues that dominate the rest of the story.

11 — Oral Care and All OtherThe second review, and the residual

Oral Care sits inside "All Other", which declined 16.9% on a reported basis in the second quarter and 2.4% organically — the gap being the Dermacosmetics divestiture leaving the consolidation. It is the second strategic review, and its economics are the weakest in the group: a store-brand- heavy category with soft consumption and limited pricing. We do not expect either review to produce a large headline number. The value in them is cumulative: each exit simplifies the story, removes a low-return asset and hands the balance sheet another tranche of cash, at the cost of a smaller reported revenue base every time.

12 — The divestiture machine$600 million of itself, sold to pay down debt

Since 2024 Perrigo has generated roughly $600 million in upfront proceeds from divestitures, and the company states plainly that all of it went to deleveraging. The Dermacosmetics sale alone delivered approximately $359 million of net cash, and the substantial majority was applied to the revolving credit facility.

This is the single most important behavioural fact about the company, and it deserves to be read carefully rather than applauded automatically. Selling assets to reduce debt is value-accretive when the assets are low-return and the debt is expensive. Perrigo's divested businesses — Rare Disease in 2024, Dermacosmetics in 2026 — fit that description, and the leverage target demands the cash. But the pattern also tells you what the company is not doing: it is not returning capital, it is not buying back stock at seven times earnings, and it is not investing for growth at scale. It is paying down a balance sheet. For as long as that is the priority, the equity is a claim on whatever is left after the lenders are satisfied.

13 — The write-off$1.68 billion of capital the market had already written off

Accounting is a lagging indicator, and nowhere more so than in a goodwill impairment. At 31 December 2025 Perrigo's reporting units showed an indication of impairment — a sustained decrease in the share price, lower expected cash flows principally related to infant formula market dynamics, and a change in near-term expectations for the broader self-care market. The company recognised $1,325.3 million of goodwill impairment. Then, having reallocated goodwill across its new reporting units, it recognised a further $330.8 million in the first quarter of 2026. Cumulative goodwill charges over two years: $1,685 million. Total impairment charges on the income statement, which also carry indefinite-lived intangible write-downs, were $88.9 million in FY2024 and $1,363.1 million in FY2025.

Two things follow, and they point in opposite directions. The bearish reading is that the company spent $1.7 billion of shareholders' money on acquisitions whose value has evaporated — most of it on the 2018 purchase of the European business that became Consumer Self-Care International, and the 2022 acquisition of HRA Pharma. On that reading the impairments are a confession that the capital allocation of the previous decade destroyed value.

The bullish reading is that the accounting has caught up with what the market already knew. A share price down two-thirds from its peak was itself an impairment opinion; the write-off makes it official and, being non-cash, does not touch the covenants, the dividend or the cash flow. What it does is remove the possibility of a nasty surprise later. We lean towards that reading — with a caveat. Intangibles remain roughly half of total assets, so the write-off reduced the risk of a further charge without eliminating it.

14 — The balance sheetFour turns of leverage set the ceiling on the equity

At 27 June 2026 Perrigo held $400 million of cash against $3.3 billion of total debt — net debt of roughly $2.9 billion, down $214 million over the half on the Dermacosmetics proceeds. The company guides to net leverage of, or slightly below, approximately 4.0 times adjusted EBITDA for 2026.

To see why that matters, run the numbers from the equity's point of view. Enterprise value at the 9 October price is about $4.99 billion — a $2.09 billion market capitalisation plus $2.9 billion of net debt. If Perrigo trades at 7.3 times estimated 2026 adjusted EBITDA of $683 million, then a one-turn move in the enterprise multiple is worth about $683 million, or roughly a third of the market capitalisation. The equity is a levered instrument whether or not the company intends it to be, and its behaviour will keep looking like one.

There is a second constraint that does not show up in the leverage ratio: interest. Guided net interest expense for 2026 is approximately $156 million — 23% of estimated adjusted EBITDA consumed before a dollar of tax, capital expenditure or dividend. Every incremental dollar of debt reduction is worth roughly five cents of pre-tax earnings per share, which is why deleveraging is not optional.

15 — Debt and refinancingThe first real test arrives in 2027

Perrigo carried $3,640.2 million of total borrowings at 31 December 2025, of which only $36.6 million was classified as current. The maturity ladder is manageable in any single year and demanding in aggregate: $421.9 million of Term Loan A falls due in 2027, $972.4 million of Term Loan B in 2029, $750 million of 4.900% notes in 2030, $1,126.1 million of euro- and dollar-denominated notes in 2032, and $394.4 million of long-dated paper in 2043–44.

The 2027 Term Loan A is the first refinancing the company cannot avoid, and the moment the credit market gets to re-price Perrigo's risk. The market's current opinion is visible in the rating: Ba3 at Moody's, below investment grade. A sub-investment-grade issuer refinancing bank facilities in 2027 pays a spread an investment-grade peer does not, and the difference flows directly out of the free cash flow that funds the dividend. The debt structure is not a background fact about Perrigo; it is the mechanism through which the leverage reaches the shareholder.

16 — Cash flow and the dividendA payout that free cash flow has not covered since 2024

Perrigo's cash conversion is the company's own disclosure, and it is not flattering. Cash from operating activities was $239 million in 2025, or 62.5% of adjusted net income. The first half of 2026 was an outflow of $31 million, the first quarter consumed $114 million building infant formula inventory, settling litigation and paying restructuring costs, and the second quarter recovered to $83 million. Guidance for the full year is cash from operations in the mid-60% range of adjusted net income — a target that itself signals a business converting less than two-thirds of its reported earnings into cash.

Now set that against the dividend. Perrigo pays $0.29 a quarter, $1.16 a year, which at 138.77 million shares is roughly $161 million. In 2025 free cash flow was $143.6 million against $160.7 million of dividends. In 2026, on the company's own guidance, free cash flow lands near $95—140 million against a similar dividend. The payout has not been covered since 2024 and will not be covered in 2026 either.

This is the crux. On adjusted earnings the dividend looks comfortable — $1.16 against $2.15 of guided adjusted earnings per share is a 54% payout, normal for consumer staples. On free cash flow it looks stretched. The gap between those two statements is the working capital, the restructuring cash costs, the under-absorption and the below-investment-grade interest bill. A company can run that gap for a while by borrowing or by selling assets, and Perrigo has done both. It cannot run it forever.

17 — Capital allocationFor now, the leverage target is the strategy

Perrigo's stated capital-allocation priorities are sustainable business growth, reducing total debt and net leverage, and maintaining a disciplined and balanced framework. In practice, over the past two years, the framework has had one output: debt reduction. Divestiture proceeds go to the revolver. There have been no buybacks. Capital expenditure was $93 million in 2025 and $14 million in the second quarter of 2026 — about 2% of revenue, a maintenance budget rather than a growth budget.

The defensible reading is that this is exactly right. At four turns of leverage, with a 2027 refinancing ahead and a below-investment-grade rating, paying down debt is the highest-return use of capital available. The less comfortable reading is that the strategy has been reduced to a balance-sheet objective. Between them sits the question of whether the equity deserves a re-rating or merely a narrower discount.

18 — Competition and peersA two-thirds discount, and most of it is deserved

Perrigo's competitors divide into two groups. On the branded side it competes with Procter & Gamble, Kenvue and Haleon, whose products sit next to Perrigo's store-brand equivalents on the same shelf. On the store-brand side it competes with a fragmented field of regional manufacturers and with retailers' own supply arrangements. Its structural advantage is scale in a channel where scale sets cost, and cost sets the retailer relationship.

The valuation gap is stark. Church & Dwight trades at roughly 25 times forward earnings, Kenvue near 19, Haleon near 18–19. Perrigo trades at 7.0. On enterprise value to EBITDA the gap is narrower but still large: 7.3 times for Perrigo against 11–16 for the peer set.

Most of that discount is explicable, and it is worth saying so rather than calling it an anomaly. Perrigo has negative organic growth where the peers have positive; four turns of leverage and a below-investment-grade rating where the peers have one to two turns and investment grade; and earnings split across three definitions with $1.7 billion of write-offs behind them where the peers' earnings are legible. A two-thirds discount is large even after all of that, but it is not obviously a mistake. Perrigo is cheap against its peers and expensive against its own cash flow.

19 — Regulation, tariffs and the consumerA value-seeking shopper is a tailwind and a headwind

Three external forces shape Perrigo's near-term numbers. The first is the consumer. Households trading down from national brands to store brands is precisely the behaviour Perrigo is built to serve, and it is why the company keeps gaining share. But the same caution also shrinks the category: fewer units, smaller baskets and a slower start to seasonal categories such as allergy and cough-and-cold, which cost revenue in both reported quarters of 2026.

The second is trade policy. Perrigo recognised a recovery of a portion of previously paid tariffs in both quarters of 2026 — approximately $21 million in the first — which is a real cash benefit and a real distortion of the year-over-year margin comparison. The company also operates manufacturing in Israel, which introduces both a geopolitical risk premium and, historically, a currency-translation benefit.

The third is regulation, and here the exposure is asymmetric in a useful way. The prescription-to-over-the-counter switch pathway is the most reliable structural growth vector in consumer health: a successful switch creates a category only a few manufacturers can supply immediately. Opill is the proof of concept, and Specialty Care is the segment that converts regulatory change into margin.

20 — GovernanceA board that took the pain in one year

Perrigo's board has had an unusually active eighteen months. It determined that its chief executive had breached the code of conduct and accepted his resignation the same day. It appointed a sitting director as interim chief executive and launched an external search. It presided over the largest impairment in the company's history and a new segment structure, approved the Dermacosmetics sale and opened two strategic reviews, and reaffirmed full-year guidance on the day the chief executive left.

Governance is hard to judge from outside, but two things are observable. The board's response to the conduct finding was swift and unambiguous, which is what shareholders should want. And the cluster of decisions — impairments, the chief executive's exit, divestitures, guidance reaffirmation — has the shape of a deliberate reset: take the pain in one period, clear the decks, and hand a clean company to a permanent chief executive. That is coherent, and by construction it makes the current year look as bad as it can. Investors who buy the reset are betting on a management team that has not yet been hired.

21 — ValuationFive methods, one answer, and a 7% discount to the price

Valuation here is unusually sensitive to which earnings definition you accept, so we use five methods and take the median. At the 9 October close of $15.06, Perrigo's market capitalisation is $2.09 billion on 138.77 million shares, and enterprise value is $4.99 billion once $2,895 million of net debt is added.

The methods: guided 2026 adjusted earnings per share of $2.15 at 6.5 times, which is where the stock traded for much of the past year, gives $14.00. A 2027 base case of $2.42 — the guided range midpoint with the under-absorption fully rolled off and no recovery in revenue — at 6.0 times gives $14.50. Free cash flow of roughly $140 million at a 7.0% required yield gives $14.30. Estimated adjusted EBITDA of $683 million at 6.0 times, less net debt, gives $13.70. And the dividend itself, $1.16 capitalised at an 8.0% yield, gives $14.50. The median is $14.20, and we round to a $14.00 target.

The distribution is wide, and for a reason that has nothing to do with forecast accuracy. Every method produces a value between $13.70 and $14.50 on the same assumptions, because they are all variations on one question: what multiple does a shrinking, levered consumer business deserve? A one-turn change in the exit multiple moves the answer by more than $2 a share. That is why a wide distribution is the honest way to present it.

22 — The bull caseNormalised earnings are $2.75, and the stock is at seven times $2.15

The strongest version of the bull case starts with the under-absorption. Perrigo guided to $0.60 of adjusted earnings per share destroyed in 2026 by the deliberate decision to run factories below capacity in order to bring production in line with demand. That is a one-year cost, and $0.44 of it is already spent. Add it back to the guided midpoint of $2.15 and normalised earnings power is roughly $2.75 — which, at $15.06, is 5.5 times.

23 — The bear caseSix things have to go right, and one of them is the dividend

The bear case does not require anything dramatic. It requires only that the second half arrives as guided and that the market continues to apply a low multiple to it.

24 — Risk matrixTwelve risks, ranked by probability and impact

25 — CatalystsWhat would change our mind, and when

26 — ConclusionThe cleanup is real; the recovery is in the price

Perrigo in October 2026 is a company that has spent eighteen months doing the unpleasant work. It wrote off $1.7 billion of goodwill it could no longer defend. It removed a chief executive who had breached its code of conduct. It sold a business, put two more under review, and applied every dollar of the proceeds to debt. It lifted service levels by more than a thousand basis points and reaffirmed guidance three times while doing it.

None of that is a reason to buy the shares at $15.06. It is a reason to stop describing the company as a value trap. A value trap is cheap because nothing is being done; Perrigo is cheap because the thing being done is expensive, slow and unproven at the revenue line. The distinction tells you what to monitor. This is not a story about a multiple re-rating on sentiment; it is a story about whether a store-brand manufacturer with four turns of leverage and a 7.7% dividend can convert an operational turnaround into a revenue turnaround before the balance sheet forces its hand.

Our estimate of fair value is $14.00 a share — a 7% discount to the 9 October close and below the street's $16.50. That is not a forecast of failure. It is the median of five valuation methods applied to the company's own guidance, reflecting two judgments: that the second-half hockey stick is more likely to be delivered than beaten, and that the dividend's coverage gap is a genuine risk the market is right to price.

We rate the shares Neutral with a negative skew. We would become buyers in the low teens, where the enterprise value implies a low-single-digit multiple on normalised EBITDA and the dividend risk is fully reflected, and sellers above $18, where the shares would be discounting a completed turnaround that has not yet begun. Between those levels, Perrigo is a well-run cleanup with an unhedged balance sheet — not a description that commands a premium while the revenue line is still shrinking.

27 — AppendixFinancial summary

FY2026E net sales applies the guidance midpoint of −3.5% to the FY2025 base of $4,253.1 million. FY2023 and FY2024 figures are as reported in Perrigo's FY2025 Form 10-K and are presented for trend only; the company did not report All In and Core measures in those years. "n/d" means not disclosed on a comparable basis. Reported diluted EPS is total-company and includes discontinued operations; continuing-operations EPS was $(0.03), $(1.17) and $(10.12) for FY2023–25. Goodwill impairment is from the 10-K roll-forward (Note 10); the income statement's impairment charge line, which also carries indefinite-lived intangible write-downs, was $90.0 million, $88.9 million and $1,363.1 million for FY2023–25.

28 — SourcesPrimary and secondary references

This report is built from primary disclosure wherever possible.

Primary — company filings and releases

Perrigo Company plc Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 27 June 2026. Earnings releases from continuing operations for the fourth quarter and fiscal year 2025, the first quarter 2026 and the second quarter 2026, with the Q2 2026 earnings presentation. Press releases: the leadership transition (8 June 2026), the Infant Formula strategic review (5 November 2025) and the Dermacosmetics divestiture agreement (14 July 2025).

Secondary — market and category data

Third-party market data aggregators for the share price, market capitalisation, share count, dividend yield, forward multiples and peer valuation ranges, as at September–October 2026. Circana MULO+ Omnichannel and consolidated IQVIA, Nielsen and Circana category datasets as cited in Perrigo's Q2 2026 presentation.

29 — DisclosureIndependence and method